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São Paulo - Congonhas Airport, founded in 1936, the second busiest airport
in Brazil, represents one of the essential hubs for business and figures as the most
profitable route in Brazilian domestic operation, being the connection between Rio
de Janeiro and São Paulo. In July of 2007, Congonhas airport runway was the
protagonist of the most significant Brazilian air crash in history, where 199 people
died. An Airbus 320 from TAM Airlines performed a runway excursion and
collided with a building nearby the runway threshold. The accident caused a huge
national commotion, demanding immediate official actions and measures to
prevent new events from taking place in the airport. At that time, media
speculations stated that the junction of a considerably short runway with a
potentially slippery runway condition, associated with the heavy-aircraft operation,
was incompatible and significantly dangerous. Together with these assumptions,
the aircraft involved in the accident was dispatched with one Engine Thrust
Reverser inoperative (which is not an unusual operational condition). But under the
public sight, the lack of an engine reverse sounded like one of the first accident
causes. Consequently, the intense public pressure over the government led the
authorities to untimely restrict the Airport operation. Congonhas Airport (CGH)
operational limitations were implemented before the conclusion of the official
investigation.
Problem
Restrictions were issued during the investigations and implemented through
the Civil Aviation Instruction IAC 121-1013, published on April 1st, 2008,
impacting the heavy-jets operation and, as a result, the airlines. The IAC 121-1013
main restrictions included: Minimum Equipment List, Limitation of Extra Fuel
load, Wet runway landing obligations, and Prohibition of Takeoff and Landing.
More than 10 years after the accident, the same Congonhas IAC121-1013
restrictive measures remain in effect. As CGH is one of the most critical hubs in
the country, any limitation to its capacity represents a significant impact on airlines
and users. Since the event of the accident, several technologies have been
implemented by the aircraft manufacturers, which allow the pilot to evaluate in a
more precise way the impact of any failure in the landing distance performance.
Purpose
The central objective of this research case is to investigate Congonhas
IAC121-1013 measures, analyzing its technical background and safety
effectiveness. Simultaneously, the researchers will evaluate which standard of the
Advisory Circular most effective, increasing safety, and which is only detrimental
to the efficiency of air transportation. This research will expand the analysis of the
measures applied to the Congonhas Airport through the IAC121-1013, highlighting
the actual causes of the accident based on the official conclusive investigation. One
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of the new technologies the researchers explored is the use of Electronic Flight Bag
(EFB). The implementation of the landing performance assessment through EFB
allows pilots to have a realistic scenario and precise calculation of the landing
condition, even in the case of failures or items deferred by the aircraft Minimum
Equipment List (MEL).
Literature Review
Two pillars are considered fundamental by the researchers to perform air
transportation: 1) the safe conduction of operation, and 2) the economic viability of
the operation and its efficiency.
Background
In 1996, 11 years before the 2007 accident, CGH Airport was the scene of
a Fokker 100 crash, killing more than 100 people a few minutes after takeoff. The
cause of the accident was a failure in the aircraft's reverser system that was
spuriously deployed, not allowing the plane to remain airborne after takeoff. Due
to the repercussion of this accident and other minor crashes, the airport is known
by the public's opinion as a critical airport. It has always been in the headlines of
Brazilian newspapers. At the beginning of 2007, the pavement of the runway at
Congonhas airport was restored through phases to eliminate the surface
irregularities and prevent water accumulation; both were considered chronic
runaway problems. After the pavement restore process was over, more time was
needed until the runway could be grooved. At the same time, the airport authority
decided to authorize the runway operation with the grooving pavement service not
ready to avoid operational disruptions.
Aeronautical Accidents Categories
Aviation organizations worldwide define more than 40 different accident
categories. The five more significant accident categories are Runway Excursion
(RE), System/Component Failure or Malfunction (SCF), Loss of Control in Flight
(LOC-I), Abnormal Runway Contact (ARC), and Controlled Flight Into Terrain
(CFIT). Runway Excursions (RE), including both lateral and longitudinal types, are
the third more important cause of fatal accidents by numbers, and the single most
significant cause 15% of hull losses (Airbus, 2019). One of the last efforts to avoid
RE was the development of a new methodology for conveying current runway
conditions. This methodology is based on recommendations from the Takeoff and
Landing Performance Assessment (TALPA) Aviation Rulemaking Committee
(ARC). These recommendations are currently being adopted in Brazil, and it has
already been implemented in takeoff and landing performance assessment
throughout the Electronic Flight Bag (EFB).
JJ3054 2007 Air Crash in Congonhas Airport
On July 17th, 2007, the flight JJ3054, an Airbus model 320 (registration
PR-MBK), departed from Porto Alegre (POA) to Congonhas Airport (CGH) with
181 souls on board. One central issue was that the plane was dispatched with Engine
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two reverser pinned (deactivated) by MEL. Before JJ3054 landed, according to
CENIPA's Final Report, Congonhas Tower informed them that the active landing
runway (RWY35L) was wet and slippery. The airport authority authorized the
runway operation without the grooving pavement. During the landing roll, the
aircraft didn't slow down as expected, leading to a runway excursion, overrunning
the left edge of the runway near the departure end. The plane crossed over the
Washington Luís Avenue and collided with a building and with a gas station. All
souls on board plus 12 people on the ground perished (CENIPA, 2009).
Over the years, several incidences related to mistaken thrust levers have
occurred. The pinned reverser landing procedure is directed related to these
incidents, which are not limited to Airbus aircraft: two occurred in similar
conditions on flight JJ3054 from the Philippines and Taiwan. In both cases, one
reverser was deactivated (pinned), and pilots kept one thrust lever in CL position,
bringing only one thrust lever to IDLE, preventing the aircraft from decelerating.
Due to these events, Airbus changed the A-320F MEL pinned reverser landing
procedure regarding the thrust levers setting after touchdown. The CENIPA Final
report issued several recommendations to the Congonhas airport operators. One of
the restrictions was the prohibition of operation when the aircraft presents one
reverser inoperative.
Congonhas Civil Aviation Instruction - IAC 121-1013 & Review of Approach
and Landing Regulations
One of the ANAC regulatory publications is the Civil Aviation Instruction
(IAC), which aims to establish procedures or clarify rules or requirements
contained in the RBAC related to civil aviation (IAC 001-1001A, p. 4). It is similar
to the FAA Advisory Circular. In April 01st of 2008, ANAC issued the Congonhas
Civil Aviation Instruction (IAC 121-1013) that established additional technicaloperational procedures and requirements necessary to authorize the safe operation
of large reaction transport aircraft at Congonhas Airport (São Paulo).
The Congonhas IAC imposed limits (or prohibition) to the landing
operation depending on the aircraft conditions. The Approach-and-landing
Accident Reduction (ALAR) issued by the Flight Safety Foundation (FSF), defines
the Actual Landing Distance (ALD) as the distance used in landing and braking to
a complete stop (on a dry runway) after crossing the runway threshold at 50 feet. It
represents the landing distance published on the Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM) by
manufacturers and is also the origin of all other landing distance calculations (Flight
Safety Foundation, 2009). The Required Landing Distance (RDL) is the distance
obtained by the application of a factor to the ALD. RLD is used during the flight
dispatch process. The (RLD) should consider the weather forecast for the landing
time and apply dry and wet runway safety factors.
In Brazil, the flight dispatch process is regulated by the RBAC 121.
Furthermore, the RBAC 121.195 states that the aircraft shall land at the destination
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aerodrome using 60% of the runway length (1.67 factor) and passes 50 feet above
the runway threshold (RBAC 121.195, p. 45). When the weather forecast indicates
that the destination aerodrome runway may be wet or slippery at the estimated
landing time, no Dispatch will be allowed unless the runway length is at least 115%
(1.92 factor) of the actual landing distance for the specific conditions (RBAC
121.195, p. 42).
In Figure 1 below, the actual requirements and factors that must be applied
to the actual landing distance are displayed.

Figure 1. Landing distance dispatch requirements.
Runway End Safety Area (RESA)
Several safety recommendations came during the JJ3054 accident
investigation. On September 17th of 2007, CENIPA issued central guidance
determining the establishment of the Runway End Safety Area (RESA) in
Congonhas Airport (CENIPA Final Report, p. 103). The proposal is based on the
ICAO Annex 14, which establishes high priority to the RESA implementation.
Houses and buildings surround Congonhas Airport; therefore, there was no room
to extend the runway to implement the RESA. Consequently, the runway was
virtually reduced to accommodate a 280 meters RESA, following RBAC 154, as
shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Runway End Safety Area (RESA).
In-Flight Landing Distances & Electronic Flight Bag (EFB)
After departure, landing distances verified at the flight dispatch process
were disregarded. Once airborne, pilots are required to compute the in-flight
landing distance, instead of the flight dispatch landing calculations. The in-flight
landing distance assessment takes into account the current aircraft status, actual
runway conditions, and possible performance degradation generated by failures
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during the flight that may affect the landing distance. With the implementation of
the Electronic Flight Bag (EFB), the in-flight landing distance assessments
performed significantly changed over the past decade (FAA AC 120-76D, 2017).
The EFB In-Flight Landing Distance considers a comprehensive analysis to
determine the landing distance performance. According to the Flight Safety
Foundation, these published landing distances are seldom achieved in line
operations (ALAR, 2000). The calculations performed by the EFB consider a 7
seconds flare in the In-Flight Landing Distance. This extended flare time adds a
protection layer, as presented in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Flare time used in EFB calculations.
Methodology
To improve operating efficiency and maintain flight safety excellence, the
researchers identified the most significant constrains, their opportunities for
improvement, and the impacts of their implementation on effectiveness and safety
based on the Theory of Constraints (TOC), developed by Eliyahu Goldratt (The
Goal, 2004). The restrictions imposed on the Congonhas Airport operation are
treated as the constraints and considered the Minimum Equipment List items that
affect the landing distance, Limitation of Extra Fuel load, Wet runway landing
obligations, and Prohibition of takeoff and Landing from the auxiliary runway. The
application of RESA on the 17R / 35L runway in Congonhas airport, an enforced
restriction, was maintained. Using the EFB tool, the researchers accurately verified
how far such limits could be modified. The same tools available in the cockpit to
analyze and understand the impact of differed MEL items in landing distance
calculations and, consequently, in the safety margins were utilized. The EFB was
set up with the corresponding landing data for all failures:
Weather settings
WIND º / kt:
OAT ºC:
QNH hPa:
RWY Condition:

Published by Scholarly Commons, 2020

000/0
15 (ISA + 5)
1013
Dry

5

International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, Vol. 7 [2020], Iss. 2, Art. 11

Aircraft Configuration
Landing Weight:
64.5 or the highest possible
Landing CG:
Basic
Flap Configuration: FULL
Air Cond.:
ON
Anti-Ice:
Off
Approach Type:
Normal
Go Around Gradient: 2.5%
MAN LDG A-THR: ON
Brake Mode:
MANUAL
Reverser Use:
Yes
The target of this comparison is to highlight that the requirement of applying
the factors of 1.67/1.92 in dispatch, significantly reduces the exposure to the higher
payload. All margins presented in this research have an additional 280 meters
margin due to the virtual reduction of the Congonhas runway, the RESA. So, in any
case, every presented landing margin has an extra 280m RESA.
Outcomes
The implementation of EFBs in aircraft cockpits has allowed pilots to
determine landing performance impacts and accurately make decisions based on
margins and visual presentations displayed on EFBs. After performing the landing
analysis of the main failures that affect landing performance and comparing the
respectively achieved margins, the researchers can conclude that the impact of the
failures for the presented configuration and runway condition is minimal and does
not justify being in place. In Figure 4, We can observe that the failures have
minimal impact on safety margins. In the worst-case scenario (SEC FAULT), the
margin is 238 meters, already included 15% for a factored landing distance.
Including RESA, created by the virtual reduction of the track, there are 518 meters
(1700 feet).

Figure 4. IFLD and Margins for runway 17R (DRY).
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Tailwind operations have their limits set by aircraft manufacturers and in
specific operations by airline policies. Respecting the manufacturer's limitation, the
main focus for safe operation should be its safety margins. Due to performance, it
is preferable to land with a headwind. Therefore, airport towers will generally set
the landing runway observing the headwind criteria.

Figure 5. Same margins with different wind directions.
Indeed, the tailwind reduces the aircraft landing performance, increasing
landing distance. However, the researchers point out that tailwind makes the same
effect on landing performance as higher payloads, high temperatures, growing the
landing run. The researchers did compare the "safety margins" of two aircraft
landing under different conditions: headwind and tailwind (lightweight) and
detected no difference between margins. Although the margin is the same, the
tailwind operation (WET) is not allowed by IAC.
The most significant concern of crosswind landing is the possibility of
lateral veer off. Congonhas' main runway is 45 meters wide, which is the standard
width of almost all runways in Brazil. The researchers could not find any
relationship between the arbitrary 5-knots reduction in crosswind limitations and
risk mitigation, making this reduction pointless. Takeoffs with derated or flex
power settings aim to reduce engine maintenance and leasing. These power settings
are used on long runways that allow for better Accelerating and Stop margins
management. According to FCOM, the requirement for maximum power utilization
is justifiable on contaminated tracks or in the presence of heavy rain. Still, it has
less impact on the dump or wet tracks. The researchers believe that the runway
reduced power setting prohibition should be applied only in cases of a contaminated
runway or the presence of heavy rain. In other cases, pilots and flight dispatchers
should use EFB power settings.
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Figure 6. Flex and TOGA setting with the same Takeoff weight.
In Figure 6, the researchers can observe that in aircraft with the same takeoff
weight (60T), there is an increase in Accelerating and Stopping Distance (ASD)
that results in a reduction in the final margin. An aircraft taking off with a TOGA
thrust setting that rejects takeoff at Decision Speed (V1), when stopping the aircraft
completely, will have 197 meters ahead. While the aircraft taking off at Flex thrust
setting will have 19 meters. The EFB is set to maximize efficiency, therefore taking
advantage of the entire runway length, reducing takeoff power as much as possible.
Thus, the researchers consider the TOGA setting an unnecessary obligation. The
Congonhas auxiliary runway was closed for passenger transportation without any
apparent reason. The researchers believe that the auxiliary runway should be
available, at least for takeoff operation, as it has a positive impact on air traffic
control management. The dispatch limited to 3 tons of EXTRA FUEL is a policy
that intends to reduce aircraft landing weight. The problem is that Extra Fuel
depends not only on the amount of fuel load but also on the way the flight dispatcher
distributed this fuel. Mainly, the planned alternate airport. The same fuel quantity
may produce different Extra Fuels depending on the scheduled alternate airport.
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Table 1
Extra Fuel Manipulation with Different Alternate Airports
CLOSEST ALT AIRPORT

LONGER ALT AIRPORT

SBCT/SBSP – ALT SBKP

SBCT/SBSP – ALT SBGL

FUEL (Tons)

FUEL (Tons)

DEST

1731

DEST

1731

RRSV

200

RRSV

200

ALT - SBKP

1335

ALT - SBGL

1821

HOLD

1.075

HOLD

1075

COMP

1.96

COMP

196

MFR

4537

MFR

5023

TANKERING

3.486

TANKERING

3000

BLOCK

8023

BLOCK

8023

TAXI

228

TAXI

228

TOF

7795

TOF

7795

EZFW

54500

EZFW

54500

TOW

62295

TOW

62295

LDW

60564

LDW

60564

Conclusions
The IAC performed an essential role in calling attention to the Congonhas
airport. However, after 12 years, new technologies, the EFB, and regulations
implemented updated the takeoff and landing performance assessment and
increased the safety margin. The researchers identified that the ban of operation of
aircraft dispatched with MEL items that impact braking distance, wet runways, and
tankering does not represent relevant safety increases. Also, the RESA
implementation, complying with the ICAO recommendation, has effectively
increased operating safety margins by providing safety operation margin where it
matters. As a result, this offers additional space for the landing run.
The researchers acknowledged that the restriction imposed on the operation
related to MEL items had its origin in the assumption that a possible dispatched
MEL items can lead to additional pilot mistakes. However, the accident which
motivated the Congonhas IAC was a result of the wrong application of the
operational procedures related to the reverse thrust failure. The legislation can
never prevent faults from occurring, but it is capable of ensuring companies to have
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well-trained pilots. The use of new technologies can give pilots a more accurate
perspective of the landing and takeoff operation.
In all tests performed, the researchers found no evidence that takeoff and
landings with dispatched MEL items make the operation unsafe. Currently, the IAC
prohibits the operation in Congonhas even though there is zero increase in landing
distance. So, obeying the IAC, the pilot will have to divert the flight to another
airport. Twelve years passed, and the measures imposed to Congonhas airport has
not been revisited by authorities, even though new safety improvements (EFB and
RESA) were implemented. The researchers are proposing a review of the restrictive
measures applied to Congonhas airport through an analysis of the actual
effectiveness and impact of the rules, consequently eliminating the prohibition of
Operation with MEL performance-affecting differed items; Tankering limitation
(3.000 kg) and Wet runway limitations. The results of this research are presented
to the aeronautical authority and are being reviewed.
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